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A B S T R A C T
The literature has been inconclusive regarding the welfare effects of fiscal decentralization (FD), defined here as
the extent to which local governments collect and spend local tax revenues. We present an original model to
investigate formally the distributional and welfare implications of FD. In contrast to the standard approach that
compares the implications of full FD with that of centralization, we consider that the central government
chooses the level of FD to maximize welfare in a heterogeneous country. Noncooperatively, local governments
choose their tax collection effort to maximize local utility. We show that an increase in the tax rate leads optimal
FD to increase so as to compensate for the welfare loss from decreasing optimal local tax effort. Hence, welfare
and income distribution improve in FD at its intermediate, rather than extreme, levels. We coin this result as the
decentralization-Laffer curve. As regional spillovers increase, FD is less desirable as it deteriorates welfare and
income distribution. This finding provides a novel support for the decentralization theorem and contributes to
the fiscal policy debate.
1. Introduction
Fiscal decentralization (FD), defined as the devolution of fiscal power
and responsibilities to sub-national governmental units, has been argued
to improve democratic governance practices and thus to contribute to
economic efficiency.1 Heterogeneity in local preferences, combined with
asymmetric or incomplete information, that put local fiscal activity in a
favorable position constitute the main rationale of this argument. The
main policy implication that follows is that decentralizing public good
provision is welfare-enhancing especially when regions are heterogeneous
and spillovers are small, which is coined by Oates (1972) as the
decentralization theorem. Notwithstanding the considerable attention
the literature has paid to the efficiency and welfare implications of FD,
the findings are hitherto somewhat inconclusive.2 Investigating the
optimal level of FD vis-à-vis its redistributive, as well as efficiency,
implications seems essential for prudent fiscal policy design. This paper
aims to contribute to the literature in this regard.
Recent studies debated the argument that FD is a mechanism of
increasing efficiency in public good delivery, however, on the basis that
local governments usually do not fully internalize the externalities of
their actions and they face various forms of capacity constraints.3 To
increase efficiency and welfare, it is therefore argued that FD has to be
complemented by additional institutional mechanisms that ensure
accountability and transparency of sub-national fiscal activity. Those
mechanisms mainly entail improving governance and implementation
of fiscal rules.4 Empirical findings also suggest that it is neither possible
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econmod.2016.12.008
Received 4 May 2016; Received in revised form 29 November 2016; Accepted 9 December 2016
⁎ Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: era314@lehigh.edu (E.G. Aslim), neyapti@bilkent.edu.tr (B. Neyapti).
1 An inspection of the Fiscal Decentralization Indicators of the World Bank reveal the following stylized facts: i) federal systems generally have greater degrees of FD than the rest; ii)
developed countries are associated with higher levels of FD than less developed countries (see Neyapti (2010)); iii) expenditure decentralization is higher than revenue decentralization
in both developed and developing countries; and iv) there are varying degrees of vertical and horizontal imbalances in each country.
2 Following Tiebout's (1956) seminal work, there has been a growing literature on FD. See, for example, Oates (1972, 1998, 1999), Prud'homme (1995), and Diamond (1999) to name
a few.
3 See, for example, Prud'homme (1995), Stein (1998), Alesina et al. (1999), Rodden (2002), Tanzi (1994), and Fisman and Gatti (2000).
4 See, for example, Burki et al. (1999), Tanzi (2000), De Mello and Barenstein (2001) and Neyapti (2010, 2013)), on the importance of various attributes of governance mechanisms
for FD to be associated with improved economic outcomes. Using the IMF measures of fiscal rules across countries, Neyapti (2013) demonstrates that increasing FD is associated with
lower fiscal deficits in case of fiscal rules. Sanguinetti and Tomassi (2004), Stöwhase and Traxler (2005), Akin et al. (2014), and Neyapti and Bulut-Cevik (2014) all show that rule-based
transfer mechanisms improve fiscal efficiency.
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nor desirable to decentralize public activity entirely; hence an inter-
mediate level of FD is preferable for improving welfare or fiscal
discipline.5
The existing studies that formally model FD generally compare the
outcomes of fully centralized and decentralized fiscal structures.
Lockwood (2002), for example, investigates the effects of distributive
policies in a political economy model with externalities, and argue that, in
contrast with Oates (1972), weaker externalities may not increase the
efficiency gains from decentralization, depending on the nature of
heterogeneities.6 Also in a political economy framework, Besley and
Coate (2003) investigate the roles of spillovers and homogeneity for
public good provision in cases of centralized and decentralized systems.
They show that, due to cost sharing, decentralization may be superior to
centralization even when spillovers are small and regions are homoge-
neous. Bellofatto and Besfamille (2015) compare the cases of partial and
full decentralization with a focus on local fiscal and administrative
capacity. Koethenbuerger (2008) investigates the welfare differentials of
FD and centralization under spillovers and state the conditions that
support the decentralization theorem. An important exception is Janeba
and Wilson (2011) who state, also in a political economy model, that tax
competition restricts the efficiency of decentralization, and show that an
intermediate level of decentralization is optimal.
To our best knowledge, the literature has not yet provided a formal
study of the welfare and redistributive implications of the optimal
choice of the degree of FD in view of heterogeneous localities and
spillover effects. The current study presents a framework where the
extent to which the local revenue base is to be utilized locally is decided
optimally by the central government, in a strategic interaction with
local governments. It also investigates how structural and economic
factors, specifically the prevailing tax rate and the share of the public
sector vis-à-vis the private sector in the utility function affect optimal
FD.
The model assumes three types of goods in each locality: local
private good, local public good and pure public good. Assuming that
the economy is closed, the central government (G) maximizes social
welfare by choosing the degree of FD, which is assumed to be uniform
across localities.7 The model is solved as a non-cooperative game
between local governments (LGs) and G, where a representative LG
chooses its relative tax collection effort, which determines the level of
local public good. Given the complexity of the set-up, output is
assumed to be given exogenously and the model is static.
The solution of the model reveals that an increase in the tax rate
leads to an increase in optimal FD, but a decrease in the optimal tax
collection effort, as well as in the effective tax rate. Given the feasible
range of parameter values, maximum values of welfare and tax revenue
correspond to a medium range of optimal FD values. In addition,
income distribution improves for the medium range of optimal FD
values. Hence, the paper's findings caution the policy makers against a
full-fledged and unconditional fiscal decentralization.
As an extension of the benchmark model, we investigate the optimal
choice of FD when local public good provision has positive or negative
spillover effects. The solution of the model reveals that spillovers have a
positive effect on optimal FD and negative effect on tax collection effort,
which appear to challenge the main argument of the decentralization
theorem that state that spillovers reduce the welfare gains of FD.
However, simulations also show that, when both income distribution
and welfare effects are taken into account, lower rates of FD is
preferable than in the case of no spillovers.
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2
describes the model as a strategic game between the central govern-
ment and the local governments, Section 3 provides the comparative
statics and simulation results, Section 4 extends the model to incorpo-
rate spillover effects, and Section 5 concludes.
2. The model
We consider a closed economy where the initial income of each
region (Yi) is predetermined. We treat the private sector as a passive
agent so as to focus on the interrelationship between the central and
local governments. The level of spending in locality i, denoted by Y∼i ,8 is
given by the sum of private (Ci) and public spending that is composed
of local and central government spending, denoted by Gi
L and Gi
C,
respectively.9 Because GiC is pure public good, it can be written that
G G=C iC . The current framework is static; hence Ci is equal to the after
tax income as there is no capital accumulation:
Y C G G= + +∼i i iL iC (1)
where




For the tractability of the model, we assume that the only tax base is
income, from which both the local and the central governments collect
taxes. ti is the tax rate faced by region i (i=1, …, n) and it is equal to the
sum of taxes collected by the local and the central governments:
t a tϕ t ϕ= [ + (1 − )]i i (3)
where ai is the relative tax collection effort (or capacity) of LG
vis-à-vis the central government in region i. ϕ is the level of fiscal
decentralization (ϕ ∈ [0, 1]) that stands for the share of the local
government in both total tax-revenue collection and public spending.10
The first component of ti, a ϕti , is the portion of tax revenue that is
collected by LGi and constitutes the sole source of financing for local
public spending (Gi
L)11; given ϕ, ait is the effective tax rate of LGi. The
second component of ti, ϕ t(1 − ) , the portion of local taxes that is
collected by G and spent as GC, is consumed in equal amounts by each
locality. Hence, Gi
C stands for a positive transfer to region i if
ϕ tY G(1 − ) <i C .12 All variables are expressed in per capita terms. t is
the constant average income tax faced by a representative agent in each
region, and is assumed to be given exogenously.13
The regions are assumed to be homogeneous in all respects
other than their initial incomes, hence, the model focuses on a
representative LG. There is no tax competition. We first solve for
the benchmark case of n=2, where G and LGs act non-cooperatively
to determine the optimal levels of ϕ and ai, respectively, given t.
5 See, for example, Neyapti (2010). The non-linear effects of FD are also demonstrated
by Wang (2013) in the context of the FDI flows to China. While there are numerous
studies on the macroeconomic effects of FD in China, Qichun (2014), for example,
investigates the effects of FDI flows on FD in China and finds a positive association;
Zhang and Zou (1998) demonstrate the negative effects of FD on growth in China. Mah
(2013) observes that FD does not have a significant effect on income distribution.
Gradstein (2016) explains the incentive for non-democratic governments to adopt fiscal
decentralization, mainly to avoid the hold-up problem.
6 Among the recent studies, Crivelli and Staal (2013), for example, investigate the
bailout policy of the government vis-à-vis the optimal size of the local public good and
conclude that the size of districts matter for the decision making. Hatfield (2015)
demonstrates that tax policy is chosen optimally to promote growth under decentraliza-
tion and not under decentralization.
7 Oates (1972) refers to it as policy uniformity. See, also Cremer and Palfrey (1996).
8 Total spending (Y∼i ) differs from income (Yi) by the amount of (positive or negative)
transfers made by the central government. However, for the whole economy, the
government budget is in balance, hence: Y Y∑ = ∑∼i i i i.
9 One may consider Gi
L as the local public good.
10 For simplicity, ϕ is assumed to be invariant across regions.
11 One could model local spending to result from joint projects of the local and central
governments. The large extent of nonlinearities already existing in the model, however,
lead us to exclude this option for purposes of clarity in presentation.
12 Both regions receive positive transfers when t > 0 and Y > 0i for all i.
13 No explicit solution can be found to the problem where G optimizes both ϕ and t
due to the highly non-linear constraints of the model. An optimal solution for both ϕ and
t can be found, however, under the leader-follower type game as the corner solution,
where ϕ* ≅ 1; a * ≅ 0i ; and t* ≅ 0. This solution, however, is not economically intuitive.
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Both players are best responding to each other by acting strategi-
cally and the joint solution of their best response functions yields
the Nash equilibrium. This framework is similar to Cournot's
duopoly model (see, for example, Daughety, 1989). The social
planner's problem yields the same optimal results as in this
solution procedure because of regional symmetry assumption.14
2.1. The local governments’ problem
The representative local government chooses its tax collection effort
in order to maximize the local utility that is composed of both private
and public (central and local) spending in the region. Local consumers
and LG do not distinguish between GL and GC and hence receive the
same level of utility from both.15 The utility function is concave and
assumed to take the following log-linear form:







The first order condition of the problem subject to the constraints given













2.2. The central government's problem
The government chooses ϕ in order to maximize the social welfare,
which is the unweighted sum of local utilities:









Given the expressions in Eqs. (1) and (2), the problem yields the first
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Lemma 2.1. LG's best response function implies that ϕ and ai are
strategic substitutes whereas for G they are strategic complements.
Proof. We need to show that the derivative of ai with respect to ϕ is
non-increasing in the LGs’ problem, and the derivative of ϕ with
respect to ai is non-decreasing in the G's problem. In
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non-negative for t ϕ, ∈ [0, 1].
Lemma 2.2. The joint solution of Eqs. (5) and (6) yields the optimal
values for ϕ and a representative ai:
ϕ αt β βt
αt βt
a β
β t α β
* = − + 2
+ 2
and * = −





Proof. See Appendix A.
For a given set of feasible values of α β t{ , , }, the above solutions
yield single values for ϕ* and a*i , which implies that the joint solution
of the problem exists. In addition, the proof of Lemma 2.1 shows that
the best response functions intersect at a single point, which ensures
that the equilibrium is unique.
In a Stackelberg framework, where we model the relationship
between G and LG sequentially, we let G to be the first mover and
choose ϕ and LG to follow by choosing ai. This setup yields the same
optimal values as those found in Eq. (9). Hence, the first-mover
advantage does not exist.16
Lemma 2.3. ϕ* and a*i are both feasible for t > α β
1





Proof. For a* ≥ 0i , the necessary condition is: t > =
β
α β α β+ 2
1









For ϕ* ∈ (0, 1) the constraint is: 0 β t α β< < ( + 2 ), which is the same
condition for a*i .
17
This condition implies that as (α β/ ) increases, the minimum value
of t decreases to obtain the feasible range of the optimal values of the
problem solution. To give a numerical example, the lower bound for t is
0.3 3 for α β= = 0.5, and 0.2 3 for α = 0.7 and β = 0.3, for the feasibility
of the solution. In the extreme case of β = 0, a*i is zero and ϕ* is one,
which is the case of full decentralization, implying no tax collection and
no spending by the government. In the opposite case, the condition
that ensures optimality of ϕ is that it is equal to zero (or β tα tβ= + 2 ),
which is also the condition for a*i to go to infinity.
Proposition 2.1. The minimum tax rate for which the competitive
(decentralized) solution obtains increases as the relative utility share
of the government spending (β α/ ) increases.
An example to clarify the above observations can be given for the
cases of France and the U.S.: expenditure decentralization is about 0.45
in the U.S., whereas it is about 0.20 in France.18 With the average tax
rate (measured by the tax burden to GDP ratio) of 0.25 and the share of
government spending of 0.39, the U.S. does not appear to have an
optimal level of ϕ. The current level of ϕ in the U.S. would be
consistent, ceteris paribus, with a higher average tax rate, which is
about 0.52 according to Eq. (9). For the case of France, where the
average tax rate is about 0.45 and the government spending is about
0.22, ϕ* is approximately 0.23 according to Eq. (9), which is very close
to the actual rate of 0.20. This framework therefore suggests the
existing rate of ϕ in France is about the welfare maximizing rate.
3. Comparative statics
This section further examines the non-cooperative solution of
the optimal decisions of LGs and G. Comparative statics reported
below are based on the closed form solutions (see Appendix B):
ϕ t ϕ α ϕ β a t a α a β∂ */∂ > 0; ∂ */∂ > 0; ∂ */∂ < 0; ∂ */∂ < 0; ∂ */∂ < 0; ∂ */∂ > 0i i i
(10)
The following explanations can be provided. First, the positive relationship
of ϕ* with t19 arises because it is optimal for G to increase ϕ to compensate
for the reduction in a*i 's. LGs’ optimal response to an increase in t is to
reduce ai's so as to compensate for the utility loss from a decrease in the
disposable income, which reduces the utility from private consumption. The
positive association between t and ϕ* is consistent with the empirical
evidence, for example, for the case of China (Qichun, 2014).
14 The solution is available from the authors upon request.
15 We assume that government spending in a given locality generates local public
good, whose source does not matter; undirected transfer spending would justify this
assumption.
16 The result is different, however, when we introduce spillovers.
17 This specification is defined to avoid corner solutions as it is discussed earlier.
18 The numbers are rounded up. FD indicators are obtained from the World Bank, and
the tax burden to GDP ratio is obtained from the Economic Freedom Index of the
Heritage Foundation.
19 The positive response of ϕ* is decreasing in t.
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Proposition 3.1. ϕ* increases in t and a*i decreases in t.
Proposition 3.1 indicates that the effect of an increase in t on local tax
revenue can be ambiguous and a tax-Laffer curve may or may not exist.
We investigate this issue with the help of simulations in the next section.20
The comparative statics also indicate that optimal ϕ is positively
related with the share of the private sector (α). It is also observed that
the sign of the relationships between a*i and α, and a*i and β, are
negative and positive, respectively. This is because increasing a*i
reduces disposable income, which reduces local utility more the higher
the relative utility share of the private sector (α β/ ). Therefore, as α gets
higher, LGs prefer to exert less effort to collect taxes.
Proposition 3.2. The higher is the ratio (α β/ ), the higher is ϕ*.
3.1. Simulations and numerical examples
In this section, we investigate the interactions of the optimal
choices of a ϕ{ ; }i with the rest of the model variables
C G G a Y Y U U{ ; ; ; ; ; ; and }∼i iC iL i i i LG G and the parameters α β t{ ; and },
where ULG and UG denote the levels of utility pertaining to LG and
G. We refer to UG as “welfare”. Further, we investigate the relationship
of a ϕ{ *; *}i with income distribution (Y Y/1 2).
To obtain numerical solutions, we assign values to the model
parameters as follows: α β t{ ; ; } ∈ [0, 1]. We also fix one region's income
and define the other region's income as a multiple (x) of that, where x
varies over the range of [1, 10], which means that the income level in
one region can be as small as one-tenth of the other region. Numerical
simulations are performed covering all the feasible ranges of the
underlying model parameters, where a* ∈i ++; ϕ* ∈ [0, 1]; and C{ i,
Gi
C, Gi
L, Yi, Y } ∈
∼
i +. The simulations generate 5,520 data points, an
example of which is provided in Appendix C. Based on these, the
following observations can be made:
i. Appendix C presents a numerical example of the simulation
results. It demonstrates that income distribution improves as ϕ*
decreases, for a given t, corresponding to an increase in α (and a
decrease in β). In response, income distribution (Y Y/1 2) takes the values
of 1.53 and 1.40, respectively, as opposed to the initial ratio of 2. This
reflects that the redistributive role of the G decreases with ϕ*.21 In
addition, we observe that the effective tax rate increases in the relative
utility share of the public sector (β α/ ).22
This numerical example is only suggestive, however. A broader
picture of the effects of ϕ* can be seen based on the plots of the whole
dataset generated by the simulations. Those plots are shown in
Appendix D, which we turn to next.
ii. Fig. 1 shows that the possible range of income distribution,
corresponding to the set of alternative parameter values, is most
equitable in the case of ϕ* = 0.5. The data plots on the horizontal axis
correspond to the initial values of Y Y= = 101 2 , which implies no
redistribution and hence Y Y/1 2 remains as 1 for the whole range of ϕ*.
Fig. 2 shows that total tax collection effort is inversely related with
ϕ*. This is consistent with the negative and positive definite compara-
tive statics of t with the former and the latter, respectively.
iv. Fig. 3 shows that the highest level of tax revenue is associated
with an intermediate value of ϕ*. Because optimal tax effort declines in
ϕ* and t, the range of tax revenues shows a positive relationship with
ϕ* for ϕ* < 0.5; and a negative one for ϕ* > 0.5. This may be called as
the decentralization-Laffer curve, which shows an inverted-U relation-
ship between ϕ* and tax revenues.
v. Accordingly, Fig. 4 shows that tax revenues first increase and
then decrease in a *i . This is because a *i falls in t, which in turn
increases the tax revenue. However, we do not observe the falling
portion of the tax-Laffer curve (see Fig. 5), which implies that the
choice of ϕ* is such that its rise in t overcomes the negative effect of an
increase in t and a*i .
vi. Fig. 6 shows that welfare is also maximized for a medium range
of optimal ϕ values. Specifically, the highest values of welfare is
obtained for ϕ0.4 < < 0.7.
vii. Based on Fig. 7, we observe that the range of welfare reaches its
highest levels when income distribution is at reasonably equitable
levels (specifically, for Y Y/ < 2.51 2 ). Similar to Fig. 1, the values on the
vertical axis correspond to the case of no redistribution.
These findings indicate, in a nutshell, that both welfare and income
distribution reach their best points for a median range of ϕ* values.
This is consistent with the recent literature that argues that extreme
Fig. 1. Income distribution and fiscal decentralization. Fig. 2. Tax collection effort and fiscal decentralization.
20 This finding is consistent with the literature. See, for example, Adam et al. (2014)
for the empirical analysis of the relationship between FD and the efficiency of public
education and health spending in the OECD countries, where the authors show an
inverted-U relationship.
21 If ϕ* = 1, no redistribution takes place and post income distribution is either 2 or
0.5 as reflected by the initial values of Y1 and Y2.
22 Under the assumption that the share of the private sector consumption in utility is
0.7 and that of the public sector is 0.3, simulations for ϕ* = 0.5 reveal that the effective
tax rate faced by LGi (a ti ) is 0.46 which is consistent with developed country average (see
Appendix C). The de-facto effective tax rate (a tϕi ) is, on the other hand, 0.26.
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values of FD is not desirable for welfare and efficiency reasons (see, for
example, Thiessen, 2003; Neyapti, 2010; Wang, 2013 among others).23
4. Extension: spillover effects
The benchmark model analyzed above allows for regional hetero-
geneity only in income levels. It is common, however, that local
administrations take such actions that have effects on the welfare of
other localities. These externaties may be in the form of influencing
other localities’ tax collection capacities and public spending needs.
Positive spillovers may arise from infrastructure or education
spending. An investment on a chemical plant, for example, may
spillover negatively by polluting the environment and reducing tourism
in a neighboring region, however. Tax exporting is another form of
negative spillovers (see, for example, Boadway and Shah, 2009; Sorens,
2014).
In this section, we consider that local public spending may exert
varying degrees of spillovers across the regions. According to Oates
Fig. 3. Total tax revenue and fiscal decentralization.
Fig. 4. Total tax revenue and tax collection effort.
Fig. 5. Total tax revenue and tax rate.
Fig. 6. Welfare and fiscal decentralization.
Fig. 7. Welfare and income distribution.
23 From a practical perspective, full FD is not optimal when fiscal institutions that
ensure local tax collection efficiency are inadequate, resulting in a possible spiral of
increasing tax rate and decreasing tax collection efficiency.
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(1972), spillovers may result in the underprovision of the local public
goods and hence decentralization becomes less justified, a view that is
challenged by Lockwood (2002) in a political economy context. In
order to investigate how spillovers may alter the findings of our model,
we modify the LGs’ utility function as:
U α C β G s G β Gmax = ln + (ln + ln ) + ln ,
a








where s ∈ [ − 1, 1]i stands for the degree of spillover of region j's public
spending on region i. Two cases may arise under this specification:
under one, the information about spillovers is observed only by the
locals, and not by G; this is the case of asymmetric information. In this
case, we observe that the LGs’ first order condition does not contain si
and thus is the same as the one reported in Eq. (9). Because the optimal
solution for ϕ also remains the same as those reported above, the
distributional and welfare effects also remain the same as under no
spillover effects.
Under the alternative case, when G has the full information about
the spillovers, the G's problem becomes:












We solve the problems given in Eqs. (11) and (12), subject to the
constraints given in Eqs. (1) and (2), both as a simultaneous and
sequential move games, which are reported in Sections 4.1 and 4.2.
4.1. Simultaneous move game
Under full information about local spillovers, the first order























= 2 (1 − )
1 − − (1 − )
+












The joint solution of these first order conditions yields two distinct
roots for ϕ* and a*i that are too long to report here.
24 The comparative
statics of those solutions are also too long to report; hence the signs are
obtained through numerical simulations that cover all feasible ranges
of the parameter values, in addition to the assumption about the range
of spillovers: s ∈ [−1, 1]i . Based on the simulations, we observe that the
effects of spillovers on ϕ* and a*i are: ϕ s∂ * /∂ ≥ 0spillover i and
a s∂ * /∂ ≤ 0i spillover i, . The non-zero values of the derivatives are observed
to be very few, however, and are available mostly for negative spillovers
s( ∈ [−1, 0])i . Hence, we conclude that the derivatives are not well-
defined in this scenario.
We next investigate the relationship of ϕ* with welfare and income
distribution under spillovers. The most striking result we observe is
that decentralization-Laffer curve disappears in the case of spillovers;
that is, the intermediate range of ϕ* values do not correspond to the
highest levels of tax revenue anymore. Accordingly, income distribu-
tion and FD relationship is almost reversed as compared to the
benchmark case: income distribution worsens as ϕ* gets close to 0.5,
from above and below that point; while it is observed to improve as ϕ*
decreases, reaching the most equitable levels at ϕ* ≅ 0.1. By contrast,
the highest attainable levels of welfare correspond to more extreme
values of ϕ* (ϕ* ≅ 0.7) than the benchmark case.25 In view of these
numerical simulation results, a benevolent government facing large
regional spillovers would have to consider the trade-off between
welfare and income distribution: if equitable distribution of income is
viewed more important than increasing welfare, a low level of FD
would be optimal. This observation is consistent with the
decentralization theorem.26
The numerical examples in Appendix E also show that increasing
spillovers have a positive effect on ϕ* (compare the first two columns of
Appendix E, and the first column of Appendix E to that in Appendix C)
and result in worse income distribution than the benchmark case
reported in Appendix C. In addition, increasing spillovers is observed
to lead to worse income distribution (compare 1.58 to 1.67, or 1.50 to
1.62 in Appendix E).
4.2. Sequential move game
In an alternative scenario, where spillovers are common knowledge
to both LG and G, G moves first and sets ϕ taking LG's reaction
function into account. LG in turn, chooses ai by optimally by taking ϕ
given. This scenario is plausible considering that ϕ can be treated as a
predetermined institutional variable according to which LGs take their








































Lemma 4.1. The joint solution of Equations in (14) yields the
non-cooperative optimal values for ϕ and ai:
ϕ β
t α β s
a β α β βs
α β αt β βt βts
* = 1 −
( + (2 + ))
and
* = ( + + )












Lemma 4.2. ϕ*spillover and a*i spillover, are feasible ( ϕ0 < * < 1spillover and
a0 < * < 1i spillover, ) when β > 0.
27
Comparative statics of the optimal solutions with respect to t α β{ , , }
yield the same results as those reported earlier for the benchmark case.
















which reveals a strictly positive relationship between si and ϕ*, unlike
the non-sequential game between G and LG under spillovers; that is,
negative spillovers reduce ϕ* and positive spillovers increase it
definitively.29 These results are also observed to be much more robust
than the former case because they are defined for the whole range of
si's.
These findings appear to challenge the decentralization argument a
la Oates (1972): the presence of spillovers actually makes the case for
decentralization stronger. The simulations show, however, that the
range of ϕ* values at which welfare reaches its maximum values are
about the same as the case without spillovers: some intermediate range
of the ϕ* values (specifically, ϕ0.4 < * < 0.7), although the lower tail of
ϕ* is observed to be associated with higher levels of welfare than in the
benchmark case (as in Section 4.1).
24 The solution functions are available from the authors upon request. Of the two roots
of optimal ϕ, only the first yields data for the whole range of ϕ*; hence, the analysis is
based on the first root only.
25 For one of the roots, for which model produces feasible outcomes only for ϕ* < 0.5,
welfare is also observed to increase as ϕ* gets smaller. Data and graphs are available
upon request from the authors.
26 Decentralization theorem suggests that centralization can be justified when local
governments do not internalize the externalities or when there are large spillovers.
27 For β = 0, ϕ* = 1spillover and a * = 0i spillover, , which is not feasible as discussed earlier.
28 The proof is trivial.
29 This result is consistent with that of Koethenbuerger (2008) who shows that
increasing spillovers reduces the welfare differences between FD and centralization.
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On the other hand, decentralization-Laffer curve disappears (as in
Section 4.1): tax revenue increases as ϕ* falls and income distribution
improves as ϕ* approaches to the value of 0.1. The remainder of the
observations, namely with regards to the tax-Laffer curve, depicted in
Appendix D for the case of no spillovers remains virtually the same.
Hence, the simulation results appear to be at odds with the
comparative statics result that shows ϕ* to increase in spillovers. The
lowest levels of ϕ* are associated with the highest attainable levels of
redistribution (tax revenue) under spillovers, in contrast with the case
of no spillovers. The following explains why these findings are actually
not contradictory. Spillovers affect local utility through GLi 's that
increase in both ϕ and ai, which, however, are negatively related with
each other. When spillovers increase, if ϕ* was to increase and a*i was
to fall as much as in the benchmark case, utility from GLi's would still
rise due to spillovers. It is therefore possible that welfare reaches
highest attainable levels at lower levels of ϕ* than in the benchmark
case. The intuition can be further explained in case of a decrease in
spillovers: because G knows that a*i will increase in response, ϕ* falls
by more than the benchmark case (so that ti in Eq. (3) falls) in order to
eliminate the utility loss from a reduction in Ci.
The findings are therefore consistent with the comparative static
result that seems to challenge the decentralization theorem: as
spillovers rise, ϕ* increases. However, since the welfare measure
adopted here, which is the sum of local utilities, does not tell anything
about the income distribution resulting from the model's solution, a
sound policy recommendation calls for a careful interpretation of the
above results, which is as follows. If a benevolent government that faces
regional spillovers considers both the welfare and income distribution
implications of its choice, it would choose a low level of ϕ because it
achieves larger redistribution without compromising much the level of
welfare. From that perspective, it is indeed optimal to choose lower ϕ
for higher rates of spillovers.
5. Conclusion
This paper contributes to the literature of fiscal decentralization by
presenting a formal model to analyze the macroeconomic implications
of optimizing fiscal decentralization (FD). We consider a framework
where local governments determine their effective tax rates by choosing
the degree of their tax collection effort optimally while the central
government chooses FD optimally. Our benchmark case is when both
local and central governments form their optimal decisions simulta-
neously in a non-cooperative fashion; we then also investigate the case
of a sequential move game. Simulations are performed to assess the
welfare effects of these interactions with and without the effect of
spillovers across the regions.
The main finding of the paper is that it is optimal to increase the
rate of fiscal decentralization (FD) the higher the tax rate so as to
maintain the welfare level, given that the optimal local tax collection
effort (a*i ) decreases in the tax rate. Given the strategic
complementarity between the optimal values of FD (ϕ*) and a*i ,
increasing ϕ* first leads to an increase in the tax revenue and then
decreases it. Simulations also show that optimum welfare reaches its
highest values and income distribution becomes most equitable at
some medium range of ϕ*. We call this decentralization-Laffer curve.
This formal result makes a notable contribution to the recent decen-
tralization literature stating that extreme values of FD may not be
optimal. A tax-Laffer curve is not observed, however, since the optimal
choices of the central and local governments avoid the realization of the
falling portion of the curve.
Utilizing both non-sequential and leader-follower frameworks to
solve the benchmark model in the case of spillovers, we observe that ϕ*
increases but a*i decreases with spillovers, ceteris paribus. The extreme
levels of ϕ* are also associated with relatively low levels of welfare, as in
the case of no spillovers, although the attainable range of welfare
corresponding to lower levels of ϕ* is relatively much higher than the
benchmark case. In the presence of spillovers, revenue collection and
income distribution improves uniformly as ϕ* falls.
Taking stock, we conclude that when there are no spillovers, welfare
and income distribution improves for a median range of values of fiscal
decentralization. Extremely low and high values of FD lead to efficiency
losses that results in low tax revenues to be utilized for redistributive
purposes. In the presence of spillovers, however, the current frame-
work reveals that low FD would be the preferred policy of a benevolent
government if distribution of income matters as much as the level of
aggregate welfare.
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Appendix A. Model solution
I. Proof of LG's First Order Condition (FOC). Substituting Eqs. (1) and (2) into (4) converts the problem into an unconstrained optimization
as denoted below.
∑U αln Y ϕa tY ϕ tY βln ϕa tY βln ϕ tYmax = ( − − (1 − ) ) + ( ) + ((1 − ) )
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For each jurisdiction (i=1,2), we have the same tax effort (a1=a2).
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II. Proof of the G's FOC. Substituting Eqs. (1) and (2) into (6) converts the model into an unconstrained optimization given by:




























whose first order condition is:
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which can be simplified as:
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For two jurisdictions (i=1,2), the solution is given by:
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This expression yields three roots for ϕ; we only use this general solution for Lemma 2.1.
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which yields (where α β t ϕ0 < { , , , } < 1 ):
ϕ β αt βt
α β t
α β t β α β* = − + + 2
( + 2 )
and ( + 2 ) ≠ 0 and ( + ) ≠ 0.
In order to obtain the corresponding optimal tax effort (ai), we substitute this expression in Eq. (5):
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Since efforts are the same for each locality,
a a β
β t α β
* = * = −
− ( + 2 )1 2
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Appendix C. Numerical examples
t = {0.4, 0.6}; α = {0.5, 0.7}; β = {0.3, 0.5}; Y = {10, 20}i
Parameter values
t 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.6
α 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.5
β 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.5
Y1 20 20 20 20
Y2 10 10 10 10
Variables
ϕ* 0.42 0.62 0.17 0.44
a*i 1.36 0.63 5.00 1.25
Effective t 0.55 0.38 2.00 0.75
C1 10.77 10.77 6.67 6.67
C2 5.38 5.38 3.33 3.33
GL1 4.62 4.62 6.67 6.67
GL2 2.31 2.31 3.33 3.33
U1LG 2.70 2.70 3.05 3.05
U2LG 2.01 2.01 2.36 2.36
Welfare 4.71 4.71 5.40 5.40
Tax Revenue 20.77 20.77 30.00 30.00
Y1 22.31 22.31 23.33 23.33
Y2 14.62 14.62 16.67 16.67
YDist post( ) 1.53 1.53 1.40 1.40
Appendix D. Simulations
(α, β, t∈[0.1, 1]; x∈[1, 10]; and y xy=2 1 where the simulations pick the numbers from these ranges with 0.1 point intervals except for x. The
incremental change for x is 1 unit.).
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Appendix E. Numerical examples with spillover effects (si)
t = {0.4}; α = {0.5, 0.7}; β = {0.3, 0.5}; Y = {10, 20}i
Parameter values
t 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
α 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.5
β 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.5
Y1 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Y2 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Simultaneous Move Game (1–4) Sequential Move Game (5–8)
i = 1, 2 si=0.2 si=0.8 si=0.2 si=0.8 si=0.2 si=0.8 si=0.2 si=0.8
Variables
ϕ* 0.51 0.64 0.38 0.58 0.45 0.51 0.22 0.34
a*i 1.18 1.00 2.50 1.80 1.30 1.18 3.93 2.96
Effective t 0.47 0.40 1.00 0.72 0.52 0.47 1.57 1.08
C1 11.27 12.00 7.50 8.30 10.91 11.27 6.88 7.37
C2 5.63 6.00 3.75 4.15 5.46 5.64 3.44 3.68
GL1 4.83 5.14 7.50 8.30 4.68 4.83 6.88 7.37
GL2 2.41 2.57 3.75 4.15 2.34 2.42 3.44 3.68
U1LG 2.75 2.89 3.15 3.50 2.75 2.91 3.17 3.55
U2LG 2.10 2.37 2.53 3.08 2.10 2.38 2.55 3.14
Welfare 4.56 4.98 5.02 5.87 4.60 5.03 5.10 6.04
Tax Revenue 18.96 16.29 26.25 22.65 20.25 18.94 29.06 26.84
Y1 21.95 21.43 22.50 21.70 22.21 21.95 23.13 22.63
Y2 13.91 12.86 15.00 13.40 14.41 13.90 16.25 15.26
YDist post( ) 1.58 1.67 1.50 1.62 1.54 1.58 1.42 1.48
Appendix F. Supplementary data
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found in the online version at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econmod.2016.12.008.
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